Announced as the “COP of COPs” for desertification in an international calendar that placed it as the third of the major COPs of the Rio Conventions in 2024 – the first two (Climate and Biodiversity) having ended in major setbacks in terms of commitments – the COP16 desertification conference in Riadh, Saudi Arabia, carried high hopes. Were they fulfilled?
While the surface area covered by the buildings housing the work of COP16 – right in the centre of Riyadh, which was under construction for the Metro – was impressive, and while the announced attendance figures (between 17,000 and 23,000 people, depending on the source) and 600 parallel events seem to attest to an unusual level of activity for desertified COPs, questions remain about these figures for participation in the negotiations (in the blue zone) and the rather commercial exhibition space for the general public (in the green zone). The late cancellation of the Heads of State segment also raises questions. The sudden doubling in the number of accredited civil society organisations (CSOs) – some of which were invited and funded directly by the host country – in a single COP, the greater presence of the private sector under the CSO banner and the attendance at certain sessions also raise their share of questions.
As far as the contextual and geopolitical aspects are concerned, it is clear to everyone that the host country – Saudi Arabia, whose stance at the recent climate and biodiversity COPs has been criticised – is seeking international stature and wants to have an impact on a number of international issues. To this end, reducing the negative perception of its fossil fuel-based economic model in a world where the ecological transition is imperative is certainly strategic. But holding a COP in a country willing to invest substantial resources in promoting a multilateral event on the environment was only part of a perfectly justified concern on the part of the UNCCD to gain a higher profile in the international debate. An alliance of reason, so to speak.
The organisational and logistical aspects had not been left to chance, in particular through the use of an impressive contingent of highly available volunteers (we are talking about several thousand people) spread over all the areas, as well as numerous foreign service providers, notably French. The work of the CST, the CRIC, the SPI and the COP in general was therefore remarkably well organised, directly attributable to the considerable resources mobilised. The intention to make a mark was explicit, and some enthusiastic comments, particularly in the circle of CSOs, are probably partly based on this context. So much for the framework.
Progress, disappointments and a COP with mixed results
However, while the declarations made several times by the organisers for “the largest and most inclusive United Nations conference on land” (as the UNCCD puts it) seem to have been partly confirmed, it has to be said that the results seem less substantial in terms of progress.
The first disappointment was the inability of the Parties to conclude a multilateral agreement on drought, despite four years of work by the ad-hoc intergovernmental group and the 6 options proposed in its report. Despite Africa’s firm demand for such an agreement, it has come up against a great deal of opposition, particularly from developed countries including the European Union, motivated as is often the case by fear of the funding commitments that would be linked to it, but also by certain weaknesses in the arguments used to convince and operationalise such an agreement. The intergovernmental group has been reconvened to refine the proposal, and its work will be presented for decision at COP17.
Another disappointment, this time on the part of CSOs, was the unwillingness of states to accept CSOs as observers in the contact groups, which negotiate subjects on which there is no consensus before presenting them to the plenary. This request, supported by many countries, notably the EU, was refused by many countries, including African countries. Participatory democracy remains a sensitive issue even in the hushed confines of the United Nations.
With regard to the operation of the UNCCD and its secretariat, the increased budget requested on account of inflation and the expansion of its activities was only retained for 80% of the initial proposal, i.e. USD 17 million for 2025 and 2026. A warning was raised about the lack of funding for the employee pension scheme. In addition, some limited expenditure was authorised for a study on the technical support to be provided to the SPI, for travel and external services, and for the operation of the future strategy group. While the United States is the largest contributor, France is the sixth largest contributor after China, Japan, Germany and the United Kingdom. Is the UNCCD’s ambition really compatible with this budget? By comparison, the budget for the Climate Convention for the same period is USD 74 million; how can we fail to see in this a lack of interest in the land question, which is the foundation of environmental issues?
The direct link with food security and adaptation to climate change, particularly in terms of co-benefits, has been more strongly asserted than in the past and has served to justify the new priority given to land restoration and drought resilience in public policy. In this respect, it is to be hoped that land restoration alone will not be favoured on the pretext that it seems better suited to integrating market-based economic models. Whereas the dimensions of avoiding or reducing degradation, which are much less attractive financially at this stage and even harmful to certain private interests, are certainly more promising and, above all, can be implemented directly by the millions of poor rural people and benefit them.
One step forward was the recognition of the work undertaken by the Convention’s Science-Policy Interface (SPI), which was set up in 2013 and had reached the end of its mandate. Its work, presented at the session, shows that three quarters of ice-free land areas have become permanently drier over the last 30 years. This finding is accompanied by a prediction that five billion people will be living in arid zones by 2100. The decision gives the SPI a more permanent status within the UNCCD. This is with the intention of having more continuous access to scientific data and analysis on which to base decisions (explicitly mentioned), as well as undertaking to build close working links with the other two panels of the Rio conventions, the IPCC (climate) and the IPBES (biodiversity).
In the 37 decisions reported from COP16 desertification (more than twice as many as for the Climate COP), most of them relate much more to functional aspects and institutional arrangements of the Convention to increase its effectiveness than to new commitments. What is remarkable is the a priori significant importance given to a whole series of new initiatives, dynamics or groups of influence, such as the “Indigenous Peoples Caucus”, the “Local Communities Caucus”, the “Youth Forum” and its offshoots of “young negotiators” or “young land heroes”. The work of the “Business4Land” initiative for the private sector and the “G20 Global Land Initiative” are also being promoted.
The overall tone is summed up quite well in the statement by the President of COP16, Saudi Arabia’s Minister of Environment, Water and Agriculture, Abdulrahman Alfadley, that “this meeting marked a turning point in international awareness of the urgent need to accelerate land restoration and drought resilience”. Is the legitimate question raised by this assertion of “awareness of a need” a step forward that counts at the urgent rendezvous that history poses? Isn’t determined action the injunction that must override everything else? 30 years after the signing of the Convention in Paris, and after the indisputable assessment of the state of the world’s land, is it still possible to be satisfied with declarations which, for the most part, are made repeatedly from one COP to the next? And yet, in the words of Ibrahim Thiaw, Executive Secretary of the UNCCD, at the closing plenary session of COP16, “As we have discussed and noted, the solutions are within our grasp”. What exactly are we waiting for?
To understand the discrepancy and measure its scope, we can cite the UNCCD’s estimate of the need for “1 billion dollars of investment per day between now and 2030 to achieve the global objectives of restoring land and combating desertification and drought” (i.e. 2,600 billion dollars), compared with the stark reality that almost all of this amount has yet to be mobilised.
Concrete but limited commitments
Among the commitments made at COP16 was the pledge of the “Riyadh Global Drought Resilience Partnership”, which mobilised $12.15 billion to support 80 of the world’s most vulnerable countries in building their resilience to drought. 10 billion from the Arab Coordination Group. Few details have been provided on their implementation at this stage.
A number of other initiatives have also been announced:
- The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has announced five new projects worth a total of $60 million to step up climate and environmental efforts as part of the Saudi Green Initiative.
- The United States and several partner countries, as well as other organisations, have announced a total of almost $70 million in investment to further the “Vision for Adapted Crops and Soils” (VACS). This initiative is designed to “build resilient food systems based on diverse, nutritious, climate-adapted crops grown in healthy soils”.
- The Great Green Wall (GGW) initiative in Africa has mobilised €11 million from the Italian government for landscape restoration in the Sahel and €3.6 million from the Austrian government to strengthen coordination and implementation of the initiative in 22 African countries.
- The International Drought Resilience Alliance (IDRA) initiative, joined by Saudi Arabia in 2024, has launched the International Drought Resilience Observatory (IDRO) as the world’s first artificial intelligence-based platform to help countries assess and strengthen their capacity to cope with more severe droughts.
- In terms of gender, the countries stressed the need to pay particular attention to all forms of discrimination suffered by women and girls when designing and implementing policies and programmes relating to land degradation and drought.
- In terms of mobilising the private sector, the parties have mandated the UNCCD Secretariat and the Global Mechanism to mobilise the commitment of the private sector under the Business4Land initiative.
Brief overview of the document entitled “Action undertaken by the COP in its sixteenth edition” (Annex 2 of the COP report)
Of the 37 decisions listed, not all are explicitly decisions. There are, for example, several working reports, follow-up reports on the framework for gender, drought, sand and dust storms, land and pastoralism policies, and annexed declarations such as those from civil society organisations, the youth forum, indigenous peoples and the Riyadh declaration. The formal decisions include the dates and venues of the next COP (Mongolia in 2026) and the next CRIC (Panama in 2025), as well as their work programmes.
Decisions 15 to 22 relate more specifically to the Science-Policy Interface (SPI), including its recommendations on land-use systems, on aridity, its trends, projections and impacts, and the recommendations arising from the analysis of the IPCC’s sixth report. Also addressed are issues of knowledge sharing and technology transfer, as well as the use of nature-based solutions to avoid and reduce degradation and restore soils. Finally, a number of decisions were taken concerning the SPI’s work programme and operations in the context of the renewal of its mandate.
Several other decisions contain important clarifications;
- Decision 1 requires the Secretariat and the Global Mechanism to establish a multi-year work plan using a results-based management framework for the period 2025 to 2028. It sets out 13 expected outcomes for the implementation of the Convention, including gender equality, secure land tenure, a higher profile for the Convention, increased partnerships, increased private sector involvement, partnership building and increased resource mobilisation.
- Decision 2 requires the secretariat to establish a capacity-building strategy, collaborate with the G20 Global Land Initiative, respond positively to requests for media training, develop an internship programme for young and mid-career people, and support capacity-building in developing countries,
- Decision 3 provides an update on progress in mobilising resources to achieve target 15.3; the decision emphasises the multiple avenues of financing, including the use of flagship projects, the Global Environment Facility and the Green Climate Fund, as well as national financing.
- Decision 4 deals with communication and the quality of reporting to the Convention; it makes five reporting indicators optional. It includes the decision to set up an intergovernmental working group on the Convention’s future strategy for the post-2030 period, as well as the composition of the group.
- Decision 5 deals with civil society and its involvement in the work of the Convention. Among other things, it refers to the new groups representing civil society, such as the Youth Forum and the Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities Caucuses, as well as the renewal of the elected panel representing accredited CSOs. It called on donors to increase funding for the Convention’s Special Fund and Supplementary Fund, which should enable civil society to participate.
- Decision 6 deals with the importance of involving the private sector and implementing the Business4land strategy by integrating sustainable land and water management into governance standards.
- Decision 7 on the implementation of the UNCCD strategy for the period 2018 to 2030 stresses its integration into national strategies and plans, including budget management. It also asks the Executive Secretary to translate the concept of neutrality with regard to land degradation into a simple and practical tool for use by the general public and decision-makers alike. It calls on the secretariat and the global mechanism to implement agricultural practices based on nature-based solutions, citing agroecology in particular. It calls on the Executive Secretary to consult non-affected countries on how they can contribute to the next reporting cycle;
- Decision 8 deals with relations and partnerships with other conventions and international organisations, institutions and agencies. It places particular emphasis on collaboration and synergy with the other two Rio conventions and collaboration with their respective scientific panels (IPCC and IPBES).
- Decision 9 concerns collaboration with the GEF. It welcomes the implementation of a “multi” fund for co-benefit projects and invites the GEF to strengthen its support for countries that are implementing their voluntary plans to achieve neutrality targets. In particular, it calls for a robust replenishment of the 9th GEF Fund and an increase in its “window” for combating land degradation and drought.
Although we found the word “decision” 27 times in all the decisions, we found 14 references to “depending on the availability of resources” and 17 references to “invites”, which could indicate a degree of uncertainty as to their implementation.
